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Rhythmically coordinating with a partner can increase pro-sociality, but pro-sociality
does not appear to change in proportion to coordination success, or particular classes
of coordination. Pro-social benefits may have more to do with simply coordinating in
a social context than the details of the actual coordination (Cross et al., 2016). This
begs the question, how stripped down can a coordination task be and still affect pro-
sociality? Would it be sufficient simply to imagine coordinating with others? Imagining a
social interaction can lead to many of the same effects as actual interaction (Crisp and
Turner, 2009). We report the first experiments to explore whether imagined coordination
affects pro-sociality similarly to actual coordination. Across two experiments and over
450 participants, mentally simulated coordination is shown to promote some, but
not all, of the pro-social consequences of actual coordination. Imagined coordination
significantly increased group cohesion and de-individuation, but did not consistently
affect cooperation.
Keywords: coordinated rhythmic movement, interpersonal entrainment, interpersonal synchrony, interpersonal
coordination, rhythmic entrainment, mental simulation, joint action, imagined contact
INTRODUCTION
People coordinate their behavior with others every day, often unconsciously, through movements,
gestures, and speech. These Coordinated Rhythmic Movements (CRMs) have many effects on
our social cognitions, behaviors, and relationships; for instance, they can increase liking, rapport,
entativity, cohesion, and even cooperation between individuals (Hove and Risen, 2009; Miles et al.,
2009; Wiltermuth and Heath, 2009).
Surprisingly, the effect of CRM on pro-social behaviors is not directly driven by the details of
a coordination task. CRM’s effect on pro-sociality is not contingent on strict in-phase synchrony
(doing exactly the same thing at exactly the same time), or even on co-actors coordinating the same
movements (Cross et al., 2016). Neither the degree of coordination (Launay et al., 2013; Kirschner
and Ilari, 2014; Cross et al., 2016) nor the type of movement (fine or gross motor activities;
Wiltermuth and Heath, 2009; see also Reddish et al., 2013) directly relates to the magnitude of
post-coordination cooperation. The pro-social effects do not, therefore, seem to depend on the
coordinated movements per se, but the fact that these movements create a joint social context for
activity. A strong test of this is to remove the act of moving while preserving the joint social aspects.
One way to achieve this is simply to have people imagine coordinating.
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Mental Simulation
Imagined scenarios are thought to retain essential spatial,
temporal, perceptual, neural, and motoric properties of the events
they represent (Decety et al., 1994; Jeannerod, 2001; Miles et al.,
2014). Mental rehearsal has a positive effect on performance;
and mentally practicing a motor skill enhances performance
(Feltz and Landers, 1983, Driskell et al., 1994) across a variety of
activities (Feltz and Landers, 1983, Driskell et al., 1994), including
basketball, skiing, darts (Vandell et al., 1943; Clark, 1960; Suinn,
1972), and music learning (Coffman, 1990).
Mental simulation of social encounters can also elicit
responses similar to the real social experiences (Dadds et al.,
1997). For instance, Crisp and Turner (2009) found that
simply imagining a positive interaction with an out-group
member affects social cognition akin to actually having such an
interaction. Similarly, Garcia et al. (2002) found that imagining
being in a crowd reduces people’s helping behavior on a
subsequent task, in line with how helping behavior in real life is
reduced as a function of the number of bystanders (Latané and
Darley, 1969).
Unsurprisingly, there appears to be neural and cognitive
overlap in the operations that support mental simulation and
overt behavior (Jeannerod, 2001; Fadiga and Craighero, 2004).
Similar patterns of physiological activity are seen during mental
simulations of certain behaviors as are seen during the actual
physical execution of the behavior. For instance, Bird (1984)
demonstrated that EMG measurements from the arm were
similar when mentally rehashing ball throws as when actually
executed. Furthermore, this overlap appears to extend more
broadly beyond actions to experiences. For instance, the same
auditory cortical areas are active during imagined versus actual
experiences of listening to music (Halpern, 1988, Zatorre et al.,
1996). Mental simulation of an event seems to have both neural
and cognitive overlap with actually executing or experiencing that
event.
Previous work has also showed that not only are people
able to successfully perform imagined coordinated actions, but
when they perform imagined joint action they take into account
the same aspects of the other persons action as when actually
performing such a joint action (Vesper et al., 2014). Vesper et al.
(2014) suggest that individuals are therefore able to successfully
integrate motor simulations of their own and another person’s
actions into an imagined joint action.
Given this evidence, the effects of coordination on pro-
sociality do not appear to be intimately tied to coordination
success. People have been shown to be successful at mentally
simulating joint action, and imagined actions and interactions
are capable of fostering the same kinds of neural activity and
behavioral consequences as actually doing those things. Thus, it
is possible that CRM might be sufficient for to positively impact
pro-sociality akin to actual CRM.
Group Cohesion and Cooperation
Both group cohesion and cooperation have been shown to be
greater following CRM (i.e., Wiltermuth and Heath, 2009). In
fact, one explanation for how CRM influences variables like
cooperation is through its cultivation or strengthening of group
cohesion. Group cohesion can be defined as the bonds which
link members of a group to each other and to the group as a
whole. Group cohesion is often measured using group integrators
(i.e., how close, similar, and connected one feels to the other
individuals) and it is thought by some to mediate CRM’s effect on
cooperation. For instance, Wiltermuth and Heath (2009) found
that greater cooperation seen among groups of co-actors who
had engaged in synchronized walking was partially mediated by
greater group cohesion (see also, Wiltermuth, 2012). Although
not all research supports this hypothesis, Cross et al. (2016) found
no evidence that greater cooperation post-CRM was mediated by
group cohesion.
In the experiments reported below, we explore whether
mentally simulated synchronized walking fosters either greater
cooperation and/or cohesion in comparison with mentally
simulated solitary walking. We use a before and after measure
of cohesion to test for within participant changes which
might mediate any relationship between CRM and cooperation.
Previous work exploring group cohesion (i.e., Wiltermuth and
Heath, 2009) has shown only between group differences in
cohesion post-task, as opposed to actual changes in cohesion at
an individual level (i.e., greater cohesion within an individual
post-CRM compared to pre-CRM). In this work, we measure
actual changes in cohesion post-CRM within participants. While
previous studies have measured cohesion only in terms of group
integration (i.e., Wiltermuth and Heath, 2009; Cross et al., 2016),
we use an expanded measure of group cohesion that encompasses
both integration with and attraction to the group. Attraction to
the group relates to social perceptions concerning the group, as
well as motivations to stay in the group, and is considered a
crucial component of the group cohesion construct (see Carron
and Brawley, 2012).
The Current Experiment and Hypothesis
The social consequences of CRM do not rely on strictly
synchronous, identical, or gross muscular movements but seem
to stem simply from people moving in time (coordinating) in
some way in a social context. Mentally simulating actions can
have similar consequences as performing those actions. This
suggests that mentally simulating CRM might lead to similar
social consequences as actually engaging in CRM. The purpose
of the current study was to test whether imagined synchronized
walking was sufficient to generate increased group cohesion and
greater cooperation among co-actors as has been shown to result
from actual synchronized walking.
The goals of the present Experiment are (1) to assess whether
imagined movement is sufficient for coordination to affect group
cohesion and/or cooperation and, if so, (2) to determine whether
any changes in group cohesion mediate any effect on cooperation.
We predict that participants who imagine walking in time
with other people as opposed to walking alone will experience
greater increases in post-task group cohesion and will be more
cooperative compared to participants who imagine walking on
their own. In line with Wiltermuth and Heath (2009), we predict
that changes in pre- and post-task group cohesion will explain
any relationship between coordination and cooperation.
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A total of 95 undergraduate psychology students at Leeds
Beckett University volunteered to participate. Seven participants
did not report age and gender; the analysis below is based
on the remaining 88 participants (14 males and 74 females,
Mage = 19.71 years, SDage = 1.62). All participants were naive
to the aims of the study, did not know each other, and were
given course credit for participation. The target sample size
was 21–24 people per condition. A range was targeted rather
than a specific number in recognition of the fact that groups
could contain 3–4 people each. Sample size was determined in
the design stage based on sample sizes used in similar studies
in the literature (Wiltermuth and Heath, 2009; Miles et al.,
2010, 2014; Wiltermuth, 2012). Results were not analyzed until
data collection was completed and no additional data were
collected after analysis. We report all measures, manipulations,
and exclusions in this study. The experiment was approved by
the Leeds Beckett University Psychology Ethics Review Board.
Design
The study employed an experimental design with two between-
subjects factors: Imagined Movement (2 levels: imagining
walking alone or imagining walking in-step with the rest of
the group) and Task Enrichment (2 levels: instructions and
video or just instructions). The Task Enrichment factor was
included because the level of detail incorporated into an
imagination scenario has been shown to modulate the magnitude
of the proceeding effects. For example, the imagined contact
effect is larger following vivid rather than basic imagination
scenarios (Husnu and Crisp, 2010). Therefore, among half of
the participants, we enriched the imagination task with visual
information about the desired task (instructional videos).
Materials and Procedure
Upon entering the laboratory, the participants were seated
in groups of three or four around a table so as they could
not see each other’s written responses and were asked to not
communicate with each other. They first completed a measure of
mood and group cohesion consisting of the following questions:
(1) How happy do you feel right now? (1 = very unhappy,
5= very happy)
(2) How close do you feel to the other participants? (Not at
all – Very)
(3) How similar do you feel to the other participants? (Not at
all – Very)
(4) How connected do you feel to the other participants? (Not
at all – Very)
(5) How much would you like to see the other participants
again? (Not at all – Very much)
(6) How much do you like the other participants? (Not at all –
Very much)
(7) How attractive would you rate the other participants? (Not
at all – Very)
Participants recorded their responses to Questions 2–7 by
marking on a 180-mm continuum labeled with the end points
of the response scale. The continuum response scale was used to
make it more likely to detect any changes after the imagination
manipulation and has been successfully used in a similar context
by Lumsden et al. (2014).
Participants were then instructed to imagine walking along
a corridor. In the IN-STEP conditions, participants were
told to imagine walking in-step with the other participants
along the corridor. In the ALONE conditions, participants
were asked to imagine walking alone along the corridor.
Half of each group were first shown an 8-s video clip of
what the relevant movements would look like. The video for
the IN-STEP condition showed two people (one male, one
female, both in their early 1920s) walking along an empty
corridor in-step. For the ALONE condition, the video showed
either a male or a female walking alone down a corridor
(participants in this condition only viewed one of the videos
and the two versions were counterbalanced across experimental
sessions). All videos were filmed on an iPhone, cropped to
8 s long, and had the audio removed. After viewing the
video, participants were asked to close their eyes and imagine
performing the appropriate action. The imagination phase lasted
2 min.
After the imagination task, participants were asked to
complete a second copy of the mood and cohesion measure, along
with one added question measuring how difficult they found the
imagined movement task (5-point Likert scale, 1 = very difficult
to 5= very easy).
Finally, participants took part in a public goods game to
measure cooperation (as used by Wiltermuth and Heath, 2009;
Cross et al., 2016). The aim of the game was to collect as
many points as possible and (in order to encourage meaningful
competition without offering monetary rewards) the person
who collected the most points had a chance to win a course-
required textbook. For each round of the public goods game,
participants had 10 tokens to allocate between two accounts: a
private account and a public account. Every token in the private
account was worth 5 points to the player who allocated that
token, while every token in the public account was worth 3
points to each player in the group. The game had a total of
five rounds. During each round, participants privately recorded
how many tokens (out of a total of 10) they wished to allocate
to each of the two accounts and then recorded their public
account allocation on a separate slip which was folded and
given to the experimenter. The experimenter then privately
‘tallied’ the total public account allocation and read it out. The
actual amount reported was standardized to ensure it stayed
the same throughout all sessions. For four person groups,
results read out were as follows: Round 1 – 25 tokens, Round
2 – 26 tokens, Round 3 – 20 tokens, and Round 4 – 22
tokens. For three person groups they were as follows: Round
1 – 17 tokens, Round 2 – 18 tokens, Round 3 – 13 tokens,
and Round 4 – 15 tokens. Standardized public account totals
were used to gain a level of homogeny across different groups
over participants’ perceptions and expectations of their group
members’ choices.
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FIGURE 1 | Mean and standard errors for public account donations for
Experiment 1.
Results
We first examined the mood and task difficulty measures using
a 2 (Imagined Movement) × 2 (Task Enrichment) ANOVA.
No measures distributions deviated significantly from normality.
There were no significant main effects or interactions for either
mood change scores (mood after imagining – mood before
imaging) or task difficulty (all p’s > 0.05). It was concluded
that neither mood nor task difficulty contributed to the effects
described below.
Cooperation
The data were first explored for outliers using z-scores
in line with recommendations by Osborne and Overbay
(2004). No outliers were identified, and a Kolmogorov–
Smirnov (KS) test showed that none of the distributions
deviated significantly from normality (all p’s > 0.05) and
Levene’s test assumed equal variances (p > 0.05). We then
investigated differences in cooperation (mean amount donated
to the public account during the public goods game) across
conditions using a 2 (Imagined Movement) × 2 (Task
Enrichment) ANOVA. See Figure 1 for the mean public
account donation for each condition. There was no main
effect of either Imagined Movement [F(1,91) = 1.67, p = 0.19,
η2 = 0.02] or Task Enrichment [F(1,91) = 3.55, p = 0.06,
η2 = 0.04]. However, there was a significant Imagined
Movement–Task Enrichment interaction [F(1,91) = 4.1,
p = 0.046, η2 = 0.04]. The interaction showed that those
who imagined walking alone after watching the instructional
video cooperated less than those in the remaining three
conditions. To confirm this, we then split the data by
enrichment condition and conducted separate independent
t-tests (with Bonferroni corrected p-values) comparing
cooperation across imagined movement type. For the enriched
condition, there was a significant difference between the
cooperation scores of those who imagined walking alone
and those who imagined walking in-step [t(44) = 2.63,
p = 0.01, d = 0.77]. There was no such difference for
the non-enriched conditions [t(47) = 0.48, p = 0.63,
d = 0.14].
TABLE 1 | The rotated loadings for the factor termed Cohesion.
Rotated factor
loadings
How much do you like the other participants? 0.895
How much would you like to see the other participants again? 0.824
How close do you feel to the other participants? 0.811
How similar do you feel to the other participants? 0.804
How connected do you feel to the other participants? 0.699
How attractive would you rate the other participants? 0.693
Cohesion
Recall that our measure of group cohesion included items related
to both group integration and attraction to the group. To
test whether all items were, indeed, related to group cohesion,
an Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) was conducted using
the pre-manipulation scores for the six cohesion questions
with oblique rotation (direct oblimin). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin
(KMO) measure verified the sampling adequacy for the analysis,
KMO = 0.844. An initial analysis was run to obtain the
eigenvalues for each factor in the data. Only one factor (on which
all of the items loaded) had an eigenvalue over Kaiser’s criterion
of 1 and it explained 62.57% of the variance. The scree plot also
suggested retaining one factor as did analysis of the component
matrix. See Table 1 for factor loadings. The analysis suggests that
both ‘group integration’ and ‘attraction to the group’ are indeed
part of the same ‘group cohesion’ construct. On this basis, we
computed cohesion composite scores (the sum of the difference,
post- minus pre-manipulation, between the six cohesion change
questions).
The data were first explored for outliers using z-scores in line
with recommendations by Osborne and Overbay (2004). One
z-score above the recommended cutoff point of 3 was identified
(Participant 70, z = 3.789), and so this score was excluded from
further analysis. KS tests showed that none of the distributions
deviated significantly form normality (all p’s > 0.05), and
Levene’s test assumed equal variances (p > 0.05). We then
investigated differences in group cohesion across conditions
using a 2 (Imagined Movement) × 2 (Task Enrichment)
ANOVA. See Figure 2 for the mean cohesion change scores
for each condition. There was only a main effect of Imagined
Movement [F(1,90) = 11.607, p = 0.001, η2 = 0.11]; those
who imagined walking in-step experienced significantly greater
increases in group cohesion than those who imagined walking
alone. The main effect of Task Enrichment [F(1,90) = 0.719,
p = 0.39, η2 < 0.01] and the interaction [F(1,90) = 1.186,
p = 0.279, η2 < 0.01] were not significant. Separate one sample
t-tests confirmed that the IN-STEP condition’s mean cohesion
change scores were significantly different from 0 [t(46) = 3.6,
p = 0.001, d = 0.53] but that the ALONE condition’s were not
[t(46)= –1.22, p= 0.23, d = –0.18].
This pattern of results differs from the pattern of cooperation
scores. In the cooperation analysis, neither Imagined Movement
nor Task Enrichment had an independent effect on post-
task cooperation. Those in the video-enriched condition who
imagined walking alone were less cooperative than those in the
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FIGURE 2 | Mean and standard errors for Cohesion change scores for Experiment 1.
other conditions. In the cohesion analysis, Imagined Movement
did have an independent effect on cohesion; group cohesion
increased after imagining walking in-step but not after imagining
walking alone, and this pattern was independent of the Task
Enrichment condition. All Means, SDs, and 95% Confidence
Intervals for Experiment 1 can be found in Table 2.
Discussion
Previous CRM research has restricted the operationalization
of group cohesion to include only questions concerning
group integrators (similarity, closeness, and connectedness).
The analysis reported here suggests that group cohesion also
involves the desire to see the group again and social perceptions
of the group (group attractions) as suggested by Carron and
Brawley (2012). Participants who imagined walking in-step with
each other experienced significantly greater increases in group
cohesion than those who imagined walking alone. This is not only
the first study to show that imagined CRM can increase cohesion,
but also to show actual increases in group cohesion post-CRM
(albeit imagined CRM), as opposed to group differences. While
we did observe a significant increase in cohesion post-imagined
CRM, this was not accompanied by greater cooperation, scores
on cohesion, and cooperation measures produced very different
patterns of results. Therefore, results do not support the idea
that changes in group cohesion mediate the effect of CRM on
cooperation.
Without a video demonstration of the movement task,
imagining walking in-step did not promote greater cooperation
than imagining walking alone. With a video demonstration,
imagining walking alone seemingly negatively impacted
cooperation compared to all other conditions. This suggests that
a suitably enriched imagined solitary movement task may be
capable of decreasing cooperation/increasing competitiveness.
The result is somewhat surprising given that the effect is usually
framed as coordination doing something positive rather than
solitary action doing something negative.
Why might imagined solitary walking decrease cooperation?
Firstly, it is worth noting that cooperation was only measured
post-task, so any baseline differences in cooperation between
groups cannot be definitively ruled out. Although measuring
cooperation using an economic game only after an experimental
task is common place in the literature (Wiltermuth and Heath,
2009; Reddish et al., 2013, 2014; Cross et al., 2016).
Another potential explanation is that adequately mentally
simulating walking alone (when the imagined scenario was
suitably enriched) could have primed participants to think of
themselves more as unique individuals. The process of an
individual seeing themselves as a unique individual rather than
as a member of a group is called de-individuation (Hutter
et al., 2013). The combination of watching a video of solitary
walking followed by imagining themselves walking alone may
have led participants in this condition to think of themselves
in more individualized ways, leading to more individualistic
(competitive) choices in the economic game. However, this
explanation was formulated post hoc. Results found relating to
cooperation were not in line with our original hypothesis, the
significance level was very close to the cutoff (0.046), and our
sample size was small and a potentially limiting factor. Therefore,
we do not feel meaningful conclusions can be drawn from this
data alone. The relationship between imagined coordination and
cooperation along with the potential role of de-individuation is
further explored in Experiment 2.
EXPERIMENT 2
The results of Experiment 1 suggest that, while imagined
coordination increases group cohesion, it does not impact
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TABLE 2 | Means, SDs, and 95% CIs for cohesion and cooperation scores for Experiment 1.
Public account donation Cohesion change score
Means SD 95% CIs Means SD 95% CIs
Task enriched In-Step 4.83 1.16 (4.32,5.33) 2.99 8.72 (−0.77,6.75)
Alone 3.73 1.62 (3.03,4.43) −1.35 7.05 (−5.11,2.41)
Non-enriched In-Step 4.78 1.42 (4.19,5.37) 6.62 9.59 (2.94,10.30)
Alone 5.02 2.07 (4.15,5.9) −1.80 10.55 (−5.49,1.88)
cooperation in the same way. Cooperation differed between
the imagination conditions only when preceded by a video
demonstrating to be imagined action. We hypothesized that this
effect may have been due to an increase in de-individuation
following mentally simulated solitary walking, though this
explanation was developed post hoc. The purpose of Experiment
2 is to replicate the pattern of coordination/cohesion results
from Experiment 1 and to explore whether de-individuation
can account for these results. To enhance the generalizability
of the findings, Experiment 2 was conducted in a different
location, with a different population, and a much larger sample
size.
Consistent with the pattern of results reported in Experiment
1, we expected that group cohesion would increase following
mentally simulated CRM compared to mentally simulated
solitary movement. Similarly, we predicted that participants
would view themselves in less individualized ways post-
CRM. We also predicted that cooperation would not be
greater following mentally simulated CRM (cf. mentally
simulated solitary walking), regardless of task enrichment.
However, if significantly less cooperation was observed
in the enriched solitary walking condition (cf. all another
conditions) than this was hypothesized to be coupled with
an increase in de-individuation to account for the lower
cooperation.
Methods
Design, Materials, and Procedure
The design, materials, videos, and procedure were identical to
those used in Experiment 1 with the following exceptions:
A measure of de-individuation was added, and this measure
was adapted from Hutter et al. (2013). It was scored on a 180-mm
continuum and was delivered, alongside the cohesion measure,
before and after the imagination task.
(Q1) How much do you see yourself as (an individual – a group
member)?
(Q2) To what extent do you think of yourself as a unique
individual (not at all – very much so)? (this item is reverse
scored)
(Q3) To what extent do you qualify as a group member (not at
all – very much so)?
Questions relating to mood and task difficulty were not
included since neither variable was affected by the imagination
task in Experiment 1.
Participants
A total of 356 students and staff members at Sunway
University volunteered to participate (177 males and 179 females,
Mage = 19.57 years, SDage = 4.02, range 18–60 years). Sunway
is an international English-speaking university based in Kuala
Lumpur, whose student body is primarily comprised of Malaysian
born individuals (about 90%). All participants were naive to
the aims of the study. Participants were each paid MR 10
(approximately £2) for their time and the person who collected
the most points had a chance to win a voucher worth MR
250 (£45). Sample size was determined in the design stage
via power analysis resulting in a recommendation of 80–90
people per cell to be adequately powered to find interaction
effects. Results were not analyzed until after data collection
was completed and no additional data were collected after
analysis. We report all measures, manipulations, and exclusions
in this study. The experiment was approved by the University of
Houston International Review Board and Sunway University.
Results
Cooperation
The data were first analyzed for outliers using z-scores in
line with recommendations by Osborne and Overbay (2004).
No outliers were identified, and a KS test showed that none
of the distributions deviated significantly form normality (all
p’s > 0.05), Levene’s test assumed equal variances (p > 0.05).
We then investigated differences in cooperation (mean amount
donated to the public account during the public goods game)
across conditions using a 2 (Imagined Movement) × 2 (Task
Enrichment) ANOVA. There was no main effect of either
Imagined Movement [F(1,352) = 1.1, p = 0.296, η2 < 0.01];
or Task Enrichment [F(1,352) = 0.001, p = 0.996, η2 < 0.01],
and there was also no interaction [F(1,352) = 2.16, p = 0.142,
η2 < 0.01]. See Table 3 for the mean public account donation
for each condition. It was therefore concluded that imagined
coordination had no effect on cooperation.
Cohesion
Cohesion composite scores were computed as in Experiment
1. The data were then analyzed for outliers using z-scores in
line with recommendations by Osborne and Overbay (2004).
Three z-scores above the recommended cutoff point of 3 were
identified (participants 79: z = 3.05, 115 – z = –3.51, 168 – z = ,
299 – z = 3.07), and these scores were excluded from further
analysis. KS tests showed that none of the distributions deviated
significantly form normality (all p’s > 0.05), and Levene’s test
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TABLE 3 | Means, SDs, and 95% CIs for cooperation, cohesion, and de-individuation scores for Experiment 2.
Public account donation Cohesion change score De-individuation change scores
Means SD 95% CIs Means SD 95% CIs Means SD 95% CIs
Task enriched In-Step 5.22 2.1 (4.66,5.55) 8.16 17.13 (4.49,11.83) 3.5 15.92 (0.354,6.64)
Alone 4.86 2.25 (4.73,5.68) −2.27 18.42 (−5.96,1.43) 1.0 11.49 (−2.18,4.18)
Non-enriched In-Step 5.1 2.23 (4.97,5.91) 7.95 17.37 (4.26,11.65) 9.34 17.46 (6.17,12.5)
Alone 5.44 2.19 (4.4,5.32) −2.99 17.51 (−6.68,0.70) 1.67 14.38 (−1.49,4.83)
assumed equal variances (p > 0.05). We investigated differences
in group cohesion across conditions using a 2 (Imagined
Movement) × 2 (Task Enrichment) ANOVA. There was only a
main effect of Imagined Movement [F(1,349)= 32.46, p< 0.001,
η2 = 0.09]; those who imagined walking in-step experienced
greater increases in group cohesion than those who imagined
walking alone. Neither the main effect of Task Enrichment
[F(1,349) = 0.061, p = 0.061, η2 < 0.01] nor the interaction
[F(1,349) = 0.019, p = 0.89, η2 < 0.01] were significant.
See Figure 3 for the mean cohesion change scores for each
condition. Separate one sample t-tests confirmed that the IN-
STEP condition’s mean cohesion change scores were significantly
different from 0 [t(176) = 6.23, p = 0.001, d = 0.47] but that
the ALONE condition’s were not [t(175) = –1.944, p = 0.053,
d = –0.15]. All Means, SDs, and 95% Confidence Intervals for
Experiment 2 can be found in Table 3.
De-individuation
De-individuation composite scores were first computed
as the sum of the three de-individuation change (after
manipulation – before) items (with item 2 being reverse
coded). Positive de-individuation change scores indicate that
participants identified more as a part of a group after the
imagination task; negative de-individuation change scores
indicate that participants identified more as an individual
after the imagination task. The data were first analyzed
for outliers using z-scores in line with recommendations
by Osborne and Overbay (2004). Eight z-scores above the
recommended cutoff point of 3 were identified (participants
20: z = 3.02, 45 – z = –3.35, 56 – z = –4.71, 94 – z = –
3.44, 168 – z = –3.78, 265 – z = 4.89, 284 – z = 4.07, 299 –
z = 3.54); these scores were excluded from further analysis.
However, KS tests showed that the distributions still deviated
significantly from normality (all p’s < 0.05). We therefore
performed an Aligned Rank Transformation (ART) in line with
recommendations by Wobbrock et al. (2011). This method aligns
data before applying averaged ranks, making the data suitable
for ANOVA [see Wobbrock et al. (2011) for a more detailed
description of the ART procedure and links for tools to apply
it].
We then investigated differences in ART de-individuation
change scores using a 2 (Imagined Movement) × 2 (Task
Enrichment) ANOVA. There was a main effect of Imagined
Movement [F(1,344) = 5.85, p = 0.016, η2 = 0.02]; those who
imagined walking in-step saw a greater shift in thinking of
themselves as group members than did those who imagined
walking alone. There no significant main effect of Task
Enrichment [F(1,344) = 0.140, p = 0.709, η2 < 0.01]; or
interaction [F(1,344)= 1.775, p= 0.184, η2 < 0.01]. See Figure 4
for the mean de-individuation change scores for each condition.
Separate one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank tests confirmed that
the IN-STEP condition’s mean de-individuation change scores
were significantly different from 0 (z = 5.259, p< 0.001, r = 0.4),
but that the ALONE conditions were not (z = 1.875, p = 0.061,
r = 0.14). Imagining walking in-step caused people to become
less individuated (more group oriented).
Cohesion–De-individuation Relationship
Finally, we explored whether changes in cohesion scores were
related to changes in de-individuation scores. We ran four
separate Spearman’s correlations, one for each condition. For
those who had imagined walking in-step cohesion change was
positively related to de-individuation change, whether the task
was enriched or not (Task-enriched – rs = 0.459, p < 0.001,
Task-not-enriched – rs = 0.399, p < 0.001). For those who
had imagined walking alone cohesion change was not related
to de-individuation change, regardless of whether the task was
enriched or not (Task-enriched – rs = 0.189, p = 0.082, Task-
not-enriched – rs = 0.180, p = 0.098). Therefore, regardless
of task enrichment, among those who imagined walking in
sync, an increase in cohesion was accompanied by an increase
in perceiving oneself as a group member rather than as an
individual.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 confirmed that there was no
effect of mentally simulated CRM on cooperation, regardless of
task enrichment. This suggests that the apparent decrease in
cooperation post mentally simulated solitary walking seen in
Experiment 1 is due to a type 1 error (see following section).
In contrast to cooperation, group cohesion was affected by
imagined movement. Those who had imagined walking in-step
saw significant increases in cohesion following the imagination
task (across both experiments).
Experiment 2 also explored whether imagined movement had
any effect upon whether participants viewed themselves more
as group members rather than individuals. Results showed that
Imagining walking in-step significantly reduced de-individuation
following the imagination task. That is, imagining walking in-
step with others increased the extent to which people viewed
themselves as part of a group, rather than as individuals. Changes
in de-individuation were also found to be related to changes
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FIGURE 3 | Mean and standard errors for Cohesion change scores for Experiment 2.
FIGURE 4 | Mean and standard errors for de-individuation change scores for Experiment 2.
in group cohesion among those who had imagined walking in-
step. This suggests that some of the social effects of CRM may
be related to changes in how co-actors construe themselves in
group/individual terms.
GENERAL DISCUSSION/SUMMARY
There is now quite a lot of evidence that the effects of CRM
on pro-sociality do not depend on the kinematic details of the
coordination (Launay et al., 2013; Kirschner and Ilari, 2014;
Cross et al., 2016). This suggests that the pro-social consequences
arise from simply taking part in a joint, social activity. It is also
well established that imagining social activities can lead to the
same outcomes as actually taking part in the activity (i.e., Crisp
and Turner, 2009). Vesper et al. (2014) showed that people can
successfully mentally simulate coordinated actions; here, we show
that imagining taking part in synchronized walking can lead
to some of the same pro-social effects as actual synchronized
walking.
Group cohesion was shown to be reliably affected by imagined
CRM across both experiments. In both Experiment 1 and
Experiment 2, significant increases in group cohesion followed
mentally simulated CRM, whereas those who imagined walking
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alone experienced no change in cohesion. Although it is worth
noting that the results of Experiment 2 for the ALONE condition
were close to the cut-off point (0.053). This could be considered
as marginally significant and is a potentially important trend
as it highlights the importance of selecting appropriate control
tasks when exploring the social effects of CRM1. Solitary versions
of the coordination task are often used as control tasks in the
literature (i.e., Macrae et al., 2008; Cohen et al., 2009; Hove and
Risen, 2009; Sullivan and Rickers, 2013; Sullivan et al., 2014).
This result suggests that comparing coordinated movements
to uncoordinated group movements might make more suitable
control tasks than solitary versions of the task, if we wish to be
able to attribute any effects to CRM.
Aside from group cohesion, this work shows that imagined
CRM leads individuals to construe themselves in more
de-individualized terms. Furthermore, this increase in de-
individuation was shown to be strongly correlated with increases
in group cohesion. This suggests that the social effects of
CRM might be related to how co-actors construe themselves in
individual/interpersonal terms.
There was no conclusive evidence that engaging in
mentally simulated CRM affects cooperation between people.
In Experiment 1, it appeared that solitary walking lowered
cooperation relative to all other conditions. However, Experiment
2 found no effects of the imagination task on cooperation. Given
(1) the cooperation results in Experiment 1, which utilized a
relatively small sample size, were in the opposite direction to
what was predicted and (2) that this result did not replicate in
the adequately powered Experiment 2, we judge the results of
Experiment 2 to be the more reliable indicator of the relationship
between imagined coordination and cooperation. It is likely that
1Imagined solitary walking was chosen over uncoordinated group walking here
since it was suspected that mentally simulating a group of 3 or 4 people all walking
with completely different gaits so as to achieve no coordination may have been too
a difficult task for participants to achieve and they may have experienced a pull
toward imaging synchronously walking together [since in-phase synchrony is well
known to be a powerful attractor state (Kelso, 1995)].
the cooperative effects of CRM rely on a higher degree of fidelity
than is afforded by imagined coordination.
CONCLUSION
Mentally simulated CRM consistently increased group cohesion.
Exploratory analyses suggest that this increase in group cohesion
may be related to individuals starting to think of themselves
in more interpersonal and less individualized ways. This work
demonstrates that imagined coordination can have at least some
of the same social consequences as actual coordination and these
effects may be related to changes in de-individuation. Future
work should now contrast mentally simulated and actual CRM
in order to directly compare the social effects that are fostered by
each type of task.
ETHICS STATEMENT
Ethical approval for study 1 was granted by the Leeds Beckett
University Psychology Ethics Review Board. Ethical approval for
study 2 was granted by the University of Houston Institutional
Review Board and Sunway University. All participants gave full
informed consent by signing a consent form after reading the
study information and having the chance to ask any questions.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
LC collected all the data in Experiment 1 and wrote the first
draft. LC and GA collected all the data in Experiment 2. LC,
SG, and AW designed and analyzed Experiment 1. LC and GA
designed and analyzed Experiment 2. All authors contributed to
the writing of the manuscript.
REFERENCES
Bird, E. I. (1984). EMG quantification of mental rehearsal. Percept. Mot. Skills 59,
899–906. doi: 10.2466/pms.1984.59.3.899
Carron, A. V., and Brawley, L. R. (2012). Cohesion conceptual and
measurement issues. Small Group Res. 43, 726–743. doi: 10.1177/104649641
2468072
Clark, L. V. (1960). Effect of mental practice on the development of a certain motor
skill. Res. Q. 31, 560–569. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2013.0400
Coffman, D. D. (1990). Effects of mental practice, physical practice, and knowledge
of results on piano performance. J. Res. Music Educ. 38, 187–196. doi: 10.2307/
3345182
Cohen, E. E. A., Ejsmond-Frey, R., Knight, N., and Dunbar, R. I. M. (2009). Rowers’
High: behavioural synchrony is correlated with elevated pain thresholds. Biol.
Lett. 6, 106–108. doi: 10.1098/rsbl.2009.0670
Crisp, R. J., and Turner, R. N. (2009). Can imagined interactions produce positive
perceptions? Reducing prejudice through simulated social contact. Am. Psychol.
64, 231–240. doi: 10.1037/a0014718
Cross, L., Wilson, A. D., and Golonka, S. (2016). How moving together brings
us together: when coordinated rhythmic movement affects cooperation. Front.
Psychol. 7:1983. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01983
Dadds, M. R., Bovbjerg, D. H., Redd, W. H., and Cutmore, T. R. (1997). Imagery
in human classical conditioning. Psychol. Bull. 122, 89–103. doi: 10.1037/0033-
2909.122.1.89
Decety, J., Perani, D., Jeannerod, M., Bettinardi, V., Tadary, B., Woods, R.,
et al. (1994). Mapping motor representations with PET. Nature 371, 600–602.
doi: 10.1038/371600a0
Driskell, J. E., Copper, C., and Moran, A. (1994). Does mental practice
enhance performance? J. Appl. Psychol. 79, 481–492. doi: 10.1016/j.yhbeh.2010.
01.006
Fadiga, L., and Craighero, L. (2004). Electrophysiology of action representation.
J. Clin. Neurophysiol. 21, 157–169. doi: 10.1097/00004691-200405000-
00004
Feltz, D. L., and Landers, D. M. (1983). The effects of mental practice on motor
skill learning and performance: a meta-analysis. J. Sport Psychol. 51, 25–57.
doi: 10.1123/jsp.5.1.25
Garcia, S. M., Weaver, K., Moskowitz, G. B., and Darley, J. M. (2002). Crowded
minds: the implicit bystander effect. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 83, 843–853.
doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.83.4.843
Halpern, A. R. (1988). Mental scanning in auditory imagery for songs.
J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 14, 434–443. doi: 10.1037//0278-7393.14.
3.434
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 9 October 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 1798
fpsyg-08-01798 October 11, 2017 Time: 15:53 # 10
Cross et al. Imagined Steps
Hove, M. J., and Risen, J. L. (2009). It’s all in the timing: interpersonal synchrony
increases affiliation. Soc. Cogn. 27, 949–961. doi: 10.1521/soco.2009.27.6.949
Husnu, S., and Crisp, R. J. (2010). Elaboration enhances the imagined contact effect.
J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 46, 943–950. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2010.05.014
Hutter, R., Wood, C., and Turner, R. (2013). Individuation moderates impressions
of conflicting categories for slower processors. Soc. Psychol. 43, 239. doi: 10.
1027/1864-9335/a000108
Jeannerod, M. (2001). Neural simulation of action: a unifying mechanism for
motor cognition. Neuroimage 14, S103–S109. doi: 10.1006/nimg.2001.083
Kelso, S. J. A. (1995). Dynamic Patterns: The Self-Organization of Brain and
Behavior. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Kirschner, S., and Ilari, B. (2014). Joint drumming in Brazilian and German
preschool children: cultural differences in rhythmic entrainment, but
no prosocial effects. J. Cross Cult. Psychol. 45, 137–166. doi: 10.1177/
0022022113493139
Latané, B., and Darley, J. M. (1969). Bystander "Apathy". Am. Sci. 57, 244–268.
Launay, J., Dean, R. T., and Bailes, F. (2013). Synchronization can influence trust
following virtual interaction. Exp. Psychol. 60, 53–63. doi: 10.1027/16183169/
a000173
Lumsden, J., Miles, L. K., and Macrae, C. (2014). Sync or sink? Interpersonal
synchrony impacts self-esteem. Front. Psychol. 5:1064. doi: 10.2289/fpsyg.2014.
01064
Macrae, C., Duffy, O. K., Miles, L. K., and Lawrence, J. (2008). A case of hand
waving: action synchrony and person perception. Cognition 109, 152–156.
doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2008.07.007
Miles, L. K., Christian, B. M., Masilamani, N., Volpi, L., and Macrae, C. N. (2014).
Not so close encounters of the third kind: visual perspective and imagined social
interaction. Soc. Psychol. Pers. Sci. 5, 558–565. doi: 10.1177/1948550613511500
Miles, L. K., Griffihs, J. L., Richardson, M. J., and Macrae, C. (2010). Too late to
coordinate: contextual influences on behavioral synchrony. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol.
40, 52–60. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.721
Miles, L. K., Nind, L. K., and Macrae, C. (2009). The rhythm of rapport:
interpersonal synchrony and social perception. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 45, 585–589.
doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2009.02.002
Osborne, J. W., and Overbay, A. (2004). The power of outliers (and why researchers
should always check for them). Pract. Assess. Res. Eval. 9, 1–12.
Reddish, P., Bulbulia, J., and Fischer, R. (2014). Does synchrony promote
generalized pro-sociality? Relig. Brain Behav. 4, 3–19. doi: 10.1080/2153599X.
2013.764545
Reddish, P., Fischer, R., and Bulbulia, J. (2013). Let’s dance together: synchrony,
shared intentionality and cooperation. PLOS ONE 8:e71182. doi: 10.1371/
journal.pone.0071182
Suinn, R. (1972). Behaviour rehearsal training for ski racers. Behav. Ther. 3, 519.
doi: 10.1016/S0005-7894(72)80191-6
Sullivan, P., and Rickers, K. (2013). The effect of behavioural synchrony in groups
of teammates and strangers. Int. J. Sport Exerc. Psychol. 11, 286–291. doi: 10.
1080/1612197X.2013.750139
Sullivan, P. J., Rickers, K., and Gammage, K. L. (2014). The effect of different
phases of synchrony on pain threshold. Group Dyn. 18, 122. doi: 10.1016/S0005-
7894(72)80191-6
Vandell, R., Davis, R., and Clugston, H. (1943). The function of mental practice
in the acquisition of motor skills. J. Hum. Mov. Stud. 14, 31–38. doi: 10.1080/
00221309.1943.10544442
Vesper, C., Knoblich, G., and Sebanz, N. (2014). Our actions in my mind:
motor imagery of joint action. Neuropsychologia 55, 115–121. doi: 10.1016/j.
neuropsychologia.2013.05.024
Wiltermuth, S. (2012). Synchrony and destructive obedience. Soc. Influ. 7, 78–89.
doi: 10.1080/15534510.2012.658653
Wiltermuth, S., and Heath, C. (2009). Synchrony and cooperation. Psychol. Sci. 20,
1–5. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02253.x
Wobbrock, J. O., Findlater, L., Gergle, D., and Higins, J. J. (2011). “The aligned
Rank Transfromation for nonparametric factorial analysis using only ANOVA
procedures,” in Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Human Factors in
Computing Systems (CHI’11), Vancouver, BC, 143–146.
Zatorre, R. J., Halpern, A. R., Perry, D. W., Meyer, E., and Evans, A. (1996). Hearing
in the mind’s ear: a PET investigation of musical imagery and perception.
J. Cogn. Neurosci. 8, 29–46. doi: 10.1162/jocn.1996.8.1.29
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2017 Cross, Atherton, Wilson and Golonka. This is an open-access
article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
(CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided
the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this
journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution
or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 10 October 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 1798
